Chang'an is no more: When on-chain protocols become the new Xianyang

Author: Liu Honglin

During the May Day holiday, I drove along the Hexi Corridor and finally drove east back to Xianyang.

Standing here, one can’t help but recall those familiar names from textbooks—Ban Liang coins, Wu Zhu coins, Chang’an, Han emissaries to the Western Regions… If the Silk Road is a channel for the exchange of civilizations, then Xianyang is the starting point behind it—not just the departure point of the Silk Road, but also the origin of the imperial value order.

The role of Xianyang in history was as a system initiator. It was not just the capital of the Qin Empire, but also the starting point of a complete system for “unifying measurements, standardizing credit, and organizing value circulation.” What we refer to today as “stablecoins,” “Bitcoin,” and “on-chain settlement” may seem like technological innovations, but they are still old problems: who issues the currency, how is the price determined, and what maintains the consensus of value?

“Cheng Qin” Stablecoin: Practicality Over Everything

After Qin unified the six states, the first thing he did was not to impose taxes or expand territory, but to carry out standardization—unifying weights and measures, unifying characters, and of course, this also included currency. The introduction of “Ban Liang Qian” was a nationwide integration of currency form and value standards, and it was also a credit endorsement established based on administrative power.

The Han Dynasty further improved this structure. In the early years of the Western Han, there were multiple reforms to the currency system, ultimately establishing the “Wuzhu coin” as the national currency. Through mechanisms such as border mutual markets and gold settlement, the currency system facilitated foreign trade, forming the monetary foundation of the Silk Road.

Today, looking at stablecoins again, the logic is actually very similar. USDT has been regarded as more stable than local fiat currencies in many countries and regions. It’s not because it is politically stronger, but because it has wider circulation, more transparent credit, and lower transaction costs.

Are you saying this is not a “Xianyang-class” functional node? It has no borders, but there is an exchange rate; no emperor, but there is market tacit understanding.

USDT and USDC are not reliant on computational power or the belief in “decentralization”; they depend on anchoring, auditing, custody, and settlement efficiency—behind these elements is actually a set of systems, but it is not a national system; rather, it is a new version created by on-chain standards, commercial consensus, and a combination of quasi-regulation.

This “new type of Xianyang” is no longer maintained by terracotta warriors, city walls and edicts, but by on-chain addresses, circulation agreements and transaction habits of “you transfer and I admit the account”. It’s not necessarily legal, but it’s practical; It’s not necessarily stable, but it’s a solution that is available to most people in reality.

Its advantage lies precisely in the fact that it does not “oppose all centralization” like Bitcoin, but selectively adopts the old system and connects with financial infrastructure, thereby quickly becoming mainstream in scenarios such as cross-border payments, gray finance, and currency hedging.

In other words, it was not born for expression, but for use; it is not a token of an ideal state, but an interface for the real world. It is like the “wuzhu coin” of the digital age, emphasizing efficiency, compatibility, and universality — this is not a rebellion against the old order, but a digital rewriting of the system.

“Anti-Qin” Bitcoin: Against All Centralization

The logic of Bitcoin is almost completely opposed to the system.

It does not recognize nations, does not set up a center, and does not require you to “believe” in any institution. What it wants is precisely to “disbelieve”—do not take anyone’s word for it or assume that what is printed is true. The rules are written in code, verified by the entire network, and no one can change them. Consensus relies on computing power, order relies on rules, with extreme logic and cold principles.

This design is not a spontaneous idea; it reflects a response to the long-standing issues of centralized currency systems. And this problem is not uncommon in history.

In the late Qin Dynasty, the finances were tight, and the court quietly reduced the weight of the “banliang coin.” Although the appearance of the coin did not change, its actual value shrank significantly, leading to fluctuations in market coin values and a collapse of public trust. The “Records of the Grand Historian: Book of Prices” mentions that “the weight of coins is inconsistent, causing the people to doubt and distrust,” showing that once central credit is shaken, the entire currency system will also be destabilized.

The same was true in the early Han dynasty. Although the central government attempted to unify the coinage authority, private minting was prevalent, and enforcement was insufficient. The “Book of Han: Treatise on Food and Money” states that “there are many who privately mint coins, and despite prohibitions, it does not stop.” The types of coins were mixed, standards were inconsistent, and the grassroots trading system was almost operating autonomously. Li Zuo-jun, in his “Preliminary Exploration of the Missteps in Han Dynasty Monetary Policy,” pointed out that the disconnect between the concentration of coinage authority and its enforcement led to the hollowing out of national credit and the failure of the system.

Bitcoin is a completely technical response to the issue of “credit overflow + institutional control failure.” It does not seek to strengthen the center, but rather to eliminate it: relying not on the state, not on commercial credit, but solely on hard constraints of rules.

It is indeed not suitable for high-frequency payments, has significant price volatility, and is difficult to integrate into daily life. But it is not meant for mainstream service; it is designed for the margins—providing a unique “safety” in scenarios of financial crises, hyperinflation, and political turmoil.

It is not designed to be user-friendly, but to allow for escape; not to make the system smoother, but to provide leeway when it is completely out of control.

After Xianyang: The Freedom of Choice

“For all dynasties, the Qin legal system has been in effect. To some extent, we can say that ‘Bitcoin is anti-Qin, while stablecoins are pro-Qin.’ Bitcoin represents a profound distrust of the idea that ‘centralization will lead to corruption,’ while stablecoins are a practical response to the reality that ‘institutions need to evolve.’”

History has long proven that the truly stable currency in circulation is not because “everyone likes it,” but because “the system can support it.” And the reason the system can support it is not based on ideals, but on rules, governance, and compatibility. Whether you mint currency by decree or write a chain in code, the mechanism that “most people recognize” is the “institutional origin” you belong to.

And now, those institutional origins have shifted from Chang’an and Washington to Tether’s settlement addresses, USDC audit reports, EVM-compatible interfaces, or a stablecoin contract on-chain that is acknowledged by global users.

The legacy of Qin still exists, just transformed from cities into agreements. The choice to support Qin or oppose Qin is actually a decision made by each user when they click the “Send” button.