Budweiser's global profits surged by 16.8%, but China region slowed down with an 11% decline. How to "win it back"?

In mid-February, global beer giant Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB InBev) released its 2025 performance results.

Notably, these financials show a sense of “division.”

Globally, this is a fairly impressive set of numbers. Although total revenue of $59.320 billion (about RMB 423.7 billion) fell slightly year over year by 0.8% due to currency fluctuations, attributable net profit surged 16.8% to $6.837 billion (about RMB 48.8 billion).

In a year when overall beer consumption was soft and global volume declined by 2.3%, AB InBev pulled off a “premiumization + digitization” one-two punch, lifting EBITDA margin by 101 basis points year over year to 35.8%.

However, when the camera zooms in on Asia-Pacific—and especially the China market—the scene flips instantly.

In its Asia-Pacific annual report released on the same day, Anheuser-Busch InBev Asia Pacific (AB InBev APAC) showed that the company’s 2025 revenue was $5.764 billion, down 6.1% year over year; profit attributable to equity holders was $489 million, down sharply 32.6% year over year.

As the core engine, China’s full-year revenue fell 11.3%, volume declined 8.6%, and revenue per hectoliter also decreased by 3.0%.

This is already the fourth consecutive year that AB InBev APAC’s net profit has declined, and China has been experiencing double-digit declines for the second consecutive year.

Once the “king of nightlife” that stirred up the high-end beer market in China and kept its gross margin ahead of all local rivals, it now faces unprecedented growth anxiety.

Sell beer smarter

In 2025, AB InBev’s global total volume actually decreased 2.3% year over year, yet net profit grew by nearly 17% despite selling less beer.

Where does the money come from?

On one hand, it comes from premium brands. According to disclosures in the financial report, super-premium brand volume led by Corona grew 7.6%; in 30 markets, it delivered double-digit growth. When growth in the mainstream beer market was lackluster, high-net-worth consumers and quality-seeking consumers were still willing to pay for brand premium pricing.

Even more worth attention is AB InBev’s strategy in niche categories.

To align with global health-consumption trends, AB InBev launched an “balanced choice product mix” such as low-calorie and alcohol-free beers, achieving 8.9% growth in net revenue.

Of these, alcohol-free beer revenue surged 34% year over year, and Corona Cero’s growth rate was as high as 75%.

This rapid growth in high-gross-margin products directly lifted overall revenue per hectoliter, offsetting the revenue pressure caused by the volume decline.

On the other hand, AB InBev repeatedly emphasized its B2B digital platform BEES.

In 2025, it delivered astonishing GMV growth—“75% of the group’s revenue is achieved through digital channels.”

This system has reshaped how AB InBev connects with millions of retail outlets worldwide.

On the platform, brand owners, distributors, and retail merchants are all online at the same time, forming an interconnected network. Brand owners can see the real demand at retail outlets; retail outlets can directly see brand promotion policies; and distributors shift from information intermediaries to service providers.

Through digitalization, AB InBev can, first, “price precisely,” dynamically adjusting pricing strategies based on each region’s market affordability; second, “distribute efficiently,” reducing losses from intermediary links and improving channel turnover rates; and third, “feed data back,” quickly obtaining end-consumer data to guide product innovation.

Regional markets show a pattern of “the East doesn’t shine, the West shines.” AB InBev’s global footprint reveals a clearly divided landscape.

The Americas remain a solid pillar. The North American market continues to gain share with brands such as Michelob and Cutwater; in South America, organic revenue grew 4.9%. Colombia achieved record volume and double-digit profit growth, and Mexico delivered mid-single-digit revenue and profit growth.

The European market is “under pressure but manageable.” The impact of falling demand in mature markets was partially offset by the premiumization strategy.

The Asia-Pacific market, however, has become the only drag. Organic revenue declined 6.5%, mainly due to the China market. Korea’s market share hit a decade high, while India delivered double-digit growth.

As the global beer market enters the era of competition for a stable stock, AB InBev has proved that the survival rule of “selling less but at higher prices, and selling smarter” is feasible.

The king of nightlife was abandoned

But this rule, in the China market, met a Waterloo.

“In 2025, our performance in China did not fully realize its potential.” AB InBev APAC CEO Cheng Yanjun admitted in the financial report.

This is actually a very tactful form of self-criticism. A research note from Founder Securities pointed out that in the fourth quarter of 2025, AB InBev China’s sales volume decreased 3.9% year over year, the ton-average price fell 7.7% year over year on a like-for-like basis, and total revenue like-for-like declined 11.4% year over year. The revenue decline was greater than the volume decline.

This means its average selling price is under pressure.

First is overreliance on on-premise channels.

AB InBev’s rise in China has heavily depended on “on-premise channels” such as nightlife venues and high-end dining.

At its peak, these channels contributed more than half of its volume and also built the moat of its premium brands—on the neon-lit dancefloor of nightlife, Budweiser represented an identity symbol.

But in 2025, precisely these channels were in their “darkest hour.”

Xiao Zhuqing, an independent commentator on the alcohol industry, told Guancha.cn that AB InBev APAC has long been highly dependent on on-premise channels like dining and nightlife. But in 2025, foot traffic at this channel category remained weak, and the company failed to adjust its channel structure in time.

“In visits, we found that in the beer lists of key nightlife venues in Beijing and elsewhere, Budweiser is no longer the only choice. Brands like Heineken, Tsingtao, and Yanjing have entered in large numbers.” Xiao Zhuqing said.

Consumer weakness directly hit foot traffic at bars and upscale restaurants. “We have not seen any significant improvement yet in on-premise channels such as bars and nightlife venues,” AB InBev APAC said at its earnings call.

More fatally, when consumer scenarios rapidly shifted to homes and communities, AB InBev’s turnaround came half a beat late.

In 2024, for the first time in China’s beer industry, the share of on-non-premise channel volume exceeded that of on-premise channels, reaching 52%. In the first half of 2025, the share of beer industry volume from on-non-premise channels further rose to 60%.

AB InBev APAC’s chief financial officer Ignacio Lares previously admitted in a 2025 interim report that the share of on-non-premise channels for AB InBev China is currently slightly above 50%, below the industry average of 60%.

When consumers start getting used to buying beer on Meituan Flash Purchase, Dìngdōng Buy, and community convenience stores, AB InBev’s channel advantages instantly turned into shortcomings.

“Over the past few years, household channels and O2O have become an obvious beer consumption trend. Our layout in this area is somewhat behind the industry.” Cheng Yanjun, CEO of AB InBev APAC, also said.

Second is the “encirclement” from competitors, which tore a gap in its high-end defense line.

In the past, AB InBev’s share in China’s high-end market once exceeded 50%.

According to data from Mǎyíng [Mingying?], from Q1 2023 to Q3 2024, in the 8–10 yuan price band, Budweiser still maintained the top share, but there was a clear downward trend. In the 6–8 yuan price band, Carlsberg and Budweiser each held more than 20% share, creating a “duopoly” contest.

AB InBev APAC’s high-end market share fell from nearly 50% in 2015 to around 40% today.

In addition, domestic beer producers are attacking especially aggressively.

Take China Resources Beer as an example. Former CEO Hou Xiaohai once said, “In the next three to five years, China Resources Snow can reach a share in the high-end market relatively close to Budweiser.” China Resources Beer also acquired the high-end beer brand Heineken’s China business. In the first half of 2025, China Resources Beer’s high-end product volume grew 9%; the Heineken beer brand (China business) integrated by China Resources Beer grew more than 30% in China. The company’s gross margin hit a historic high of 48.9%;

Meanwhile, Yanjing Beer (000729) has continued to scale up its flagship product U8. It is expected that in 2025 its net profit will grow 50%–65% year over year—earning in half a year what it earned in all of last year. Tsingtao Beer (600600) has also launched the ultra-premium “One Life Legend” priced at 1,399 yuan.

These local beer brands not only “cut in line” and took share from Budweiser in the high-end market, but also seized ground in on-non-premise channels by using more flexible channel policies and marketing—for example, deeply partnering with instant retail platforms, sponsoring music festivals, and building internet-famous products.

Third is the “loss of voice” by local brands.

In the early years, AB InBev acquired local brands including Harbin Beer, Snow Beer, Nanchang Beer, Tangshan Beer, and Jinshibai.

But over the past few years, to focus on the premiumization of the core Budweiser brand, investment into these local brands has declined, and they have gradually gone quiet. “Local brands in total contributed 27% of total volume, yet face the dilemma of declining resource investment,” AB InBev said.

To respond to the downturn, AB InBev increased its investment in 2025.

For example, Harbin Beer officially announced endorsements by Wang Heti (Wang Hedì) and NBA star Haliburton, and stepped up brand promotion in on-non-premise and emerging channels. It also worked with distributors to invest in improving sales team capabilities.

How do you fight back?

Facing the predicament, AB InBev China at its national sales conference at the end of 2025 set 2026’s theme as “win back together, with one heart and one strength.”

Cheng Yanjun said clearly: “Our top task in the China market is to reignite the growth momentum and rebuild the growth engine for market share.”

AB InBev APAC also stated that in 2026 it will continue to invest in instant retail and deepen cooperation with mainstream platforms such as Meituan. Ignacio Lares revealed that its goal is to complete the maximum degree of channel penetration before the summer peak season arrives, ensuring it can fully capture the peak period of beer consumption.

If this step works, it may help close the gap AB InBev has in on-non-premise channels.

According to Ziyang Daily, AB InBev is also piloting a “fresh beer the same day” model in Ziyang, Sichuan. That means from the production line to loading onto trucks and delivering directly to customers’ sites—throughout the process taking no more than 30 minutes, achieving “ultra-fast delivery from production line to dining table.”

The model was originally designed to meet special needs of a large-scale event requiring “produce daily and deliver daily.” The model has already been included in AB InBev’s West China regional promotion plan, and will be replicated gradually in other plants in the future.

In addition, to address the shortcoming that the mid-to-high-end 8 yuan price band lacks representative products, Harbin Beer will focus on the “core++” 8–10 yuan price band by pushing strategies such as strong promotion of zero-sugar Bingshi pure draft (0 sugar) and packaging refresh initiatives, filling this gap and preventing consumers from leaving.

Xiao Zhuqing believes the 8–10 yuan price band is the fastest-growing segmented market in the industry, but AB InBev previously over-focused on ultra-premium and missed the window for layout.

Currently, China Resources Snow’s pure draft, Tsingtao’s Classic 1903, and Yanjing’s U8 have firmly occupied this price band, leaving AB InBev stuck in a dilemma of “too high to succeed, too low to compete.”

“The complete product mix is the key to breaking the deadlock. We must provide precise products for each key price point,” Cheng Yanjun said.

At the national sales conference, AB InBev also conducted a deep retrospective review of its brand matrix and proposed clear strategies.

2026 is a FIFA World Cup year for the UEFA World Cup in USA/Canada/Mexico. As a long-term partner of FIFA, this is an excellent opportunity to consolidate brand momentum and extend the ceremony of “watching games and drinking Budweiser” from bars to living rooms at home.

For example, it plans to launch a heavyweight new product “Red Bud.” It will accelerate penetration through World Cup marketing. Corona will also launch a fully open-can packaging design, extending the ritual of “enjoying with lime” from bottled to canned, further broadening its coverage in on-non-premise channels.

AB InBev will also reposition regional brands such as Nanchang, Snow Beer, Tangshan, and Jinshibai onto strategic locations.

The missions of these brands are clear: using friendly-to-the-pocket prices and a sense of regional pride to capture mainstream consumption demand, hold market share, and at the same time not affect the high-end price positioning of the core brand.

“We must keep ourselves at the forefront of the industry every single day, or we’ll be left behind in consumers’ minds.” said AB InBev China’s new president, Sheng Jinhua (Fabio Sala).

Currently, China’s nighttime economy is developing strongly. This is also a market opportunity point that AB InBev China values highly. Data shows that 60% of consumption in Chinese cities happens at night, and night is exactly the peak period for beer consumption.

Taking Guangdong province as an example, AB InBev China has built a strong and sustainable sales system, especially in the catering and entertainment sectors.

“By cooperating with retailers, we ensure they have the right products and services, and we continuously improve our own professional capabilities to provide consumers with a better experience—this is the foundation of our success,” Sheng Jinhua said.

Second, AB InBev China will bring top sports IP into China, such as the 2025 FIFA Club World Cup and the 2026 FIFA World Cup, as well as events like the 2025 Head In The Clouds Cloud Thoughts music and arts festival, and turn these competitions and events into “platforms” for deep interaction with consumers.

Beer sales are low-frequency and functional, while sports and music are high-frequency and strongly emotion-driven.

Although AB InBev’s strategic layout is clear, “winning back” is by no means easy. In a research report, Founder Securities mentioned that weak external demand remains the biggest variable.

If on-premise channels fail to recover as expected, and consumers further migrate from the high end to the mid- and low-end under a value-for-money trend, AB InBev’s premiumization strategy will face even greater pressure.

In China’s beer market, AB InBev is going through a brutal rite of competition for a stable stock.

Han Rui, chief analyst at OELT International Wine & Spirits Research, said that “in recent years, various players have been adding fuel to the high-to-mid-end segment—not only traditional alcohol companies, but also premium private-label brands operated by department stores and supermarkets have entered as well, further intensifying competition.”

AB InBev APAC’s predicament is a snapshot of how foreign giants in China’s stable market are seeking to achieve a local rebirth.

“Although the reform direction of AB InBev APAC’s leader, Cheng Yanjun, is correct, ‘a big ship is hard to turn.’ Adjusting channels, products, and organization requires time,” Xiao Zhuqing commented.

2026 will be a key validation period. Whether it can hold its base in on-premise channels and build new advantages in on-non-premise channels will determine whether this “beer king” can return to its growth trajectory.

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